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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THIS CASE 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3, as an Appeal from a Final Order 
entered in a civil proceeding. 
RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower Court err in determining that approximately 
$148,000 in Trust Deed Notes were part of the marital estate subject 
to division when such Notes came from non-marital funds of the Kidder-
Peabody account which were issued after the parties were divorced and 
were all payable back into the Kidder-Peabody fund. 
2. Did the lower Court err in failing to recognize the full 
amount of the debt which the Defendant owed to Isabel Coats. 
3. Did the lower Court err in arbitrarily charging Defendant 
with the marital asset value of $57,300 for the Brandon Canyon 
Development when such finding was not based upon any evidence. 
4• Although the Court ordered Defendant to be given a credit 
of $4,300 for Plaintiff's sale of the family boat, no such credit was 
ever given in the actual accounting. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. During the course of the marriage, the parties had three 
children, to wit: Katie, born November 2, 1979; Grace, born June 30, 
1982; and Peter, born March 18, 1986. [TR 140] 
2. Defendant was a real estate broker and the parties started 
their own brokerage company out of their home in 1982. [TR 138] 
3. The Plaintiff worked part time as a receptionist for the 
Defendant until the business ultimately moved outside the home in 
1986. [TR 138] 
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4. After 1986, the Plaintiff was not employed in the market 
place, she maintained the household. [TR 138] 
5. During the course of the marriage, the parties lived very 
well. They lived in a large house in an exclusive area of Salt Lake 
County, they purchased what they needed for clothing and vehicles, 
they began their own businesses and traveled extensively. [TR 183-184] 
6. Exhibit 27 was entered into evidence and was representative 
of the real and actual expenditures for the Plaintiff and the children 
taken from a ledger kept for several years demonstrating household 
expenditures. [TR 745] 
7. The Plaintiff testified that Defendant did not actually earn 
enough money to support the party's high life style from his real 
estate business and that from the beginning of the marriage, the 
parties lived off of the Defendant's inheritance to support the life 
style which the parties were accustomed to. [TR 750] 
8. The Defendant testified that the parties lived on part of 
the dividend from the Kidder-Peabody account. [TR 911] 
9. The Defendant testified that he inherited stock from his 
grandparents. Rather than passing inheritance from parent to child, 
it was passed from grandparent to grandchild in his family. [TR 906] 
10. Defendant testified that he received blue-chip stock prior 
to marrying the Plaintiff and that the stock was placed in a Kidder-
Peabody account. [TR 907-908] 
11. The Defendant testified that in 1986, over $260,000 stock 
that was held by Edward L. Burton Company was placed in the Kidder-
Peabody account. [TR 908] 
12. The Defendant testified that none of the stock in the 
Kidder-Peabody account was ever registered jointly. [TR 909] 
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13. The Defendant testified that the only stock which he had 
ever been given to the Plaintiff was $10,000 of General Electric stock 
in December, 1990. [TR 909-910] 
14. Plaintiff's accountant, Randy Petersen, testified that the 
Defendant was continually moving money from Kidder-Peabody to his own 
account. He testified that the Defendant had four bank accounts which 
he was using and the money would be transferred from Kidder-Peabody 
into these bank accounts. [TR 560] 
15. Mr. Petersen further testified that money from the Kidder-
Peabody account was moved into one of the four accounts that effected 
his personal life as well as his business life and that payments were 
made from these accounts for the family home, for improvements on the 
family home, purchases of automobiles, trips, clothing and credit 
cards. [TR 562] 
16. Randy Petersen testified that there was no way to determine 
the separation of money used by the Defendant and to show that it was 
not commingled with his personal life. This testimony was uncontro-
verted by Defendant. [TR 562] 
17. Randy Petersen testified that three of the bank accounts 
were primarily used for business and personal needs and that the 
fourth account opened in 1990 or 1991 was a development account for 
Brandon Canyon. He testified that there was an account for the office 
through which Peter Coats paid most of his business expenses, that 
there was a joint account between Peter and Kathryn Coats, that there 
was a personal account which was used for personal expenses, and that 
prior to that, Peter Coats had used that account quite extensively for 
business in Brandon Canyon and Coats Realty. [TR 563] Defendant con-
tinually mixed and commingled his inherited funds with marital funds. 
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18. The Defendant testified that he would buy a rental home 
which would free up their cash so that they could buy the next home 
and that a person would go ahead and buy the next home. [TR 912] 
19. The Defendant testified that he no longer had any of the 
rentals, that there was a high cost to maintain them. [TR 913] 
20. The Defendant further testified that after he sold the 
rentals, he used the stocks in the Kidder-Peabody account, that he 
would go ahead and do principal loans or loans on second mortgages to 
make it easier for people to purchase. These were bridge loans with 
someone who has a house or property and they are desiring to purchase 
another house or property, most often they have to sell that property 
before purchasing. Defendant would come through and say that if they 
would buy the property through him, he would guarantee their principal 
loan. They would go ahead and purchase their new home and would then 
pay that back when they sold their old house. The Defendant would 
take back a Trust Deed Note. The Defendant did not testify that these 
bridge loans occurred after the marriage had been terminated by the 
bifurcated proceeding. [TR 914] 
21. The Defendant testified some of the notes were bad and that 
when he was repaid on some other notes, as they were being collected, 
the proceeds were spent on living purposes. [TR 915-916] 
22. Defendant's accountant, Scott Bradford, testified to the 
foundation for Defendant's Exhibit No. 59, which was entered into 
evidence. Exhibit No. 59 is entitled "Peter M. Coats Balance Sheet 
as of April 30, 1992." The balance sheet shows $173,468 in notes 
receivable. [TR 1112] 
23. Scott Bradford also testified about the major differences 
between the balance sheet prepared by Randy Petersen (P-91) and 
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Defendant's balance sheet (D-59). In reviewing Exhibit D-60 (the 
comparison of the parties' position prepared by Scott Bradford) , there 
are no differences in the gross value of the accounts receivable 
notes. [TR 1115] 
24. The Defendant borrowed funds from his mother, Isabel Coats, 
to build "Brandon Canyon," a housing development. 
25. Isabel Coats testified about Defendant's Exhibit No. 50 that 
it was an open-ended note [TR 981], that the money was disbursed in 
increments from her Kidder-Peabody margin account [TR 981], and that 
Exhibit D-50 represented a compilation of the draws against that Note 
[TR 982]. 
26. Isabel Coats further testified that it was a bona fide loan 
to Peter Coats and that she expected payment on that Note. [TR 982] 
All of the letters and notes attached to Exhibit D- 50 added up to 
$273,000. 
27. The Defendant's accountant, Scott Bradford, testified that 
there was evidence of interest payments to Isabel Coats. He testified 
that the interest payments have been made on a regular basis, 
approximately quarterly, and that interest was paid through December 
31, 1991, as of April 30. He testified that the quarterly interest 
was approximately $7,000, and that the payments were slightly more or 
less than that. He testified that the interest payments began as 
early as 1990 and have continued through May, 1992. [1120] 
28. Scott Bradford testified under cross-examination that the 
Defendant has always had an income history from notes, and that 
Defendant's note generation began in earnest probably within the last 
couple of years. [TR 1203] 
29. David Evans, a land developer for the Plaintiff, testified 
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that as he was doing a title search, he did find a $400,000 lien owing 
to Isabel Coats which was recorded by Peter Coats. [TR 1084] 
30. Melody J. Rasmussen was called as a witness and testified 
over Plaintiff's Objection that the Note payable to Isabel Coats was 
$401,000. [TR 1379-1380] 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Standard of Review applicable to appeals involving civil 
decrees is stated in Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990), 
where the Court said that in a divorce proceeding: 
"...determining and assigning values to marital property is 
a matter for the trial court and this court will not disturb 
those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of discre-
tion. To permit appellate review of the property distribution, 
the distribution must be based upon adequate factual findings 
and must be in accordance with the standards set by this state's 
appellate court. We will not disturb a trial court's findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous, that is, against the clear 
weight of evidence or unless we reach a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The lower Court erred in determining that approximately 
$148,000 in Promissory Notes were part of the marital estate subject 
to division when such Notes came from non-marital funds such as 
Kidder-Peabody account, were all issued after the parties were 
divorced, and all payable back to the Kidder-Peabody fund, is genu-
inely raised for the first time on this Appeal. The Appellant genu-
inely failed to raise the issue before the trial Court and the Court 
never had a real opportunity to rule on the post-divorce assets issue. 
2. Even if the issue of $148,000 in Notes had been raised at 
the trial, the trial Court's determination that the Notes should have 
been included in the marital estate is appropriate. It is clear from 
the evidence presented to the trial Court that the Promissory Notes 
were commingled and became part of the marital estate. 
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3. The marital estate should be determined at the time of the 
trial and the bifurcated divorce proceeding and not at the time of the 
determination of the marriage. 
4. The lower Court's recognition of the $240,000 debt owed to 
Isabel Coats was fully supportable by the evidence. Trial Court's 
assessment of the credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed on 
appeal, and in this instance, the lower Court gave more weight and 
credibility to the testimony of Isabel Coats, the holder of the Notes. 
5. The lower Court did not err in charging Defendant with the 
marital asset value of $57,300 for the Brandon Canyon development. 
It appeared that the Judge's ruling regarding Lot 16 of Brandon Canyon 
is more favorable to the Defendant's position and clearly was not an 
abuse of discretion. 
6. The Defendant was given the credit for the $4,300 for 
Plaintiff's sale of the family boat, and he will receive the credit 
when he pays the estate equalization. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
A. THE LOWER COURT'S RULING THAT $173,468 IN TRUST DEED NOTES 
WERE PART OF THE MARITAL ESTATE WAS NOT A CLEAR ABUSE CF TOE 
TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION, WAS BASED ON EVIDENCE REASONABLY 
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT DECISION AND MUST BE UPHELD. 
The Appellant's argument that the lower Court erred in determin-
ing that approximately $148,000 in Promissory Notes were not part of 
the marital estate subject to division when such notes came from non-
marital funds of the Kidder-Peabody account, were all issued after the 
parties were divorced, and were all payable back into the Kidder-
Peabody fund, is genuinely raised for the first time on this Appeal. 
A. Principles Regarding Issues Raised for the First Time on 
Appeal. To preserve the substantive issue for appeal, the party must 
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timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial Court, and 
provide the Court a genuine opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. 
See Turtle Management, Inc., v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 
672 (Utah 1982); James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-802 (Utah App. 
1987). "Issues not raised in the trial court in a timely fashion are 
deemed waived, precluding the appellate court from considering their 
merits on appeal." Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 776 P.2d 653, 655 
(Utah App. 1989); Accord Barson v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. 682 P.2d 
832, 837 (Utah 1984); Franklin v. New Empire DEB Company, 659 P.2d 
1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). Further, the mere mention of an issue in the 
pleadings when no supporting evidence of legal authority is introduced 
at trial in support of the claim, is insufficient to raise an issue 
at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. 
James, 746 P.2d at 801. This rule is "stringently applied when the 
new theory depends on controverted factual questions whose relevance 
thereto was not made to appear at trial," Id, quoting Bogacki v. Board 
of Supervisors, 5 Cal 3 D 771; 489 P.2d 537, 543-544; 97 Cal Reporter 
657, 653-664 (1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S.C 1030, 92 S. Ct. 1301, 31 
L.Ed. 2d 488 (1972) . 
In reviewing the transcript of the trial, the parties waived 
opening argument which would have been the first opportunity Appellant 
had to bring this issue before the trial court. Because the Appellant 
waived opening argument, the next portion of the record to examine is 
Appellant's testimony. 
The Appellant initially testified regarding these Promissory 
Notes and stated that they were bridge loans. [TR 914] He found 
that he could significantly increase his real estate commissions if 
he would lend money to home owners thus allowing them to purchase new 
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homes pending the sale of their old homes. [TR 914] He further 
testified that the intention was to repay the Kidder-Peabody account, 
but that happened only about one-half the time. He also testified 
that as he was collecting the notes, they were spent on living 
expenses. [TR 914-915] 
On cross-examination, Appellant stated that Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 58 and No. 59 represented Defendant's balance sheet. He testified 
that many items on the balance sheet were not marital but that the 
balance sheets did represent the parties' assets and liabilities. [TR 
1437-1438] Defendant did not ever testify as to what assets were not 
marital other than the Kidder-Peabody account. 
While redirecting Appellee, Mr. Larew stated to the Court in 
reference to the purpose for Exhibit D-78: 
To trace the funds, your Honor, to trace the funds in and 
out of Kidder-Peabody, the purpose of these is directly from the 
Kidder-Peabody, interests alone, and some of them come back out 
with the dates we've already gotten into. It shows they were 
post-divorce related. I propose to show, your Honor, that they 
were separate property, not marital property to define them more 
clearly." [TR 1495] 
However, Mr. Larew did not ever define what property was separate 
and what property was marital. This was the only examination about 
post-divorce acquisition of assets during the entire trial. In 
closing argument, Mr. Larew stated: 
"As far as its identity being lost, we've identified 
promissory notes coming out of the Kidder account, Exhibit No. 
78, containing the notes, funds drawn out of the Kidder account 
with identification on the checks being drawn out that it was 
going for a particular transaction, particular procedure, which 
resulted in a promissory note being received by Mr. Coats. 
"It's identity has not been lost, has not been commingled 
with other funds. Mrs. Coats' name is not on any of those 
notes. She has no legal interests in any of them of any sort 
and the most that can be argued is that she has an equitable 
interest by virtue of her marriage. But that fails as it's Mr. 
Coats' own property. 
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The Court asks: Are you saying that any sub-division or 
speculative adventure that the Defendant had gone into, using 
the funds of Kidder-Peabody and so forth, should be kept 
completely out of the marital assets? 
Mr. Larew: Not necessarily. I think that could be that way. 
I think that is a fact question._ I think that depends on how 
well they were segregated and maintained and not commingled and 
lost to identity 
The Court: Are you saying that he should retain the Kidder-
Peabody stocks and all those assets, and that the sub-division, 
Brandon, would use that one and the note payable on that should 
be payable on the marital estate? 
Mr. Larew: No, I am saying the notes payable—on which note 
payable, Isabel Coats or the one he's— he's... 
The Court: The notes payable to Isabel Coats and to the Kidder-
Peabody funds. He owes money back to that fund? 
Mr. Larew: That's right, he does. I think those are—the 
Kidder-Peabody funds I think is, without question, still 
maintained by way of its integrity; it's gone in and out without 
losing that integrity. 
The Court: If he loses the fund from the Kidder-Peabody to 
assimilate wealth during the marriage, does that become part of 
the marital estate? 
Mr. Larew: That accumulation—yes, yes. 
The Court: Then you are saying his notes back to Kidder-Peabody 
would also be part of the marital estate? 
Mr. Larew: Not the principal. The note amount due that he 
borrowed from the Kidder-Peabody notes he may have written to 
Kidder-Peabody well I must be missing something because I see 
the principal comes out of Kidder, the principal comes into a 
note and if that money is drawn off for living expenses for 
payments, then yeah, that increase, whatever that increase 
whatever—whatever it's used for is part of the marital estate. 
But that principal does not, by coming out into a note, trans-
form it into a marital asset. 
The Court: Then you are saying you adopt the position taken by 
the Plaintiff in their Exhibit No. 90 and not 91? No. 90 is the 
one without the Kidder-Peabody—No, 91 is without the Kidder-
Peabody; 90 is the one with Kidder-Peabody. 
Mr. Larew: Well, to the extent they eliminate the Kidder-
Peabody, yes, I would. That's—I don't think the Kidder-Peabody 
is appropriately a part of the marital estate. [TR 1288-1290] 
Later on in closing, Mr. Larew states: 
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I want to address the promissory notes to make sure that we are 
clear on that. The promissory notes used funds coming out of 
the Kidder-Peabody. We maintain those are the sole property of 
Mr. Coats because they have not been commingled or lost through 
exchange. They were clearly identified and readily traceable. 
Would the Court have any questions about those? [TR 1305] 
Clearly, the Appellant failed to genuinely raise the issue before 
the trial Court. The Court never had a real opportunity to rule on 
the "post-divorce assets" issue. Defendant allows the Court to admit 
the Plaintiff's Exhibits P-90 and P-91 which includes the Promissory 
Notes. At one point, Defendant even accepted the Plaintiff's exhibit 
P-90 which values the Notes as a marital asset. Defendant's counsel 
in closing stated: 
The Court: Then are you saying you adopt the position taken by 
the Plaintiff in their Exhibit 90 and not 91? No, 90 is the one 
without Kidder-Peabody. No, 91 is without the Kidder-Peabody; 
90 is the one with Kidder-Peabody. 
Mr. Larew: Well, to the extent that they eliminate Kidder-
Peabody, yes, I would. That's—I don't think the Kidder-Peabody 
is appropriately part of the marital estate. [TR 1290] 
The Defendant's own exhibit, the Defendant's Balance Sheet, D-59, 
contains these Notes as assets. The Appellant is arguing against his 
own exhibits submitted at trial. 
B. The Defendant is now attempting for the first time to value 
some assets at the time of divorce rather than at the time of trial. 
These are the only assets and/or liabilities that Defendant attempts 
to value at the time of divorce rather than at the time of trial. 
Without argument, Defendant accepts the position that all other assets 
are valued at the time of trial. In and of itself, that is a new 
issue before the Court. 
B. EVEN IF THE ISSUE OF $148,000 IN NOTES HAD BEEN RAISED AT 
THE TRIAL, THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE NOTES 
SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE MARITAL ESTATE IS APPROPRIATE. 
Mortenson v. Mortenson, P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), states that 
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equitable property division pursuant to the divorce statute should 
generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheri-
tance, or a property acquired in exchange thereof, to the spouse who 
received the gift, together with any appreciation or enhancement of 
its value, unless the other spouse has by his or her effort or expense 
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or protection of that 
property, thereby acquiring equitable interest in it, or if property 
has been consumed or its identity lost through commingling or 
exchanges or when acquiring spouse's new gifts of interest bearing to 
the other spouse. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, (Utah App. 1990), the 
Court states that inherited or donated property may be part of the 
marital estate, subject to division incident or to divorce, if non-
receiving spouse augments, maintains or protects property through his 
or her efforts, the parties having inextricably commingled the 
property with the marital property so that it has lost its separate 
character or the recipient spouse has contributed to all or part of 
the property to the marital estate. In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 
(Utah App. 1980) the Court states that premarital property will lose 
its separate distinction when the parties have inextricably commingled 
it in the marital estate, or when one spouse has contributed all or 
part of the property in the marital estate. 
Plaintiff's accountant testified that the Kidder-Peabody account 
was used on a daily basis by the Defendant and could not be considered 
a separate asset of the Defendant. He further testified that the 
Defendant had four bank accounts which he was using and money would 
be transferred from Kidder-Peabody into these bank accounts. [TR 560] 
Mr. Petersen testified that there was no way to show that it was not 
commingled with Defendant's personal life. [TR 562] The Defendant 
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testified that he would go ahead and do principal loans or loans on 
second mortgages to make it easier for people to purchase. These were 
essentially bridge loans. He further testified that when the notes 
were repaid, they were spent for living purposes. [TR 915-916] None 
of this testimony was ever controverted. 
It is clear from the evidence presented to the trial Court that 
the Promissory Notes were commingled and became part of the marital 
estate. 
C. THE MARITAL ESTATE SHOULD BE DETERMINED AT THE TIME OF 
TRIAL IN A BIFURCATED DIVORCE PROCEEDING. 
Bifurcation occurred in this matter when the parties were 
divorced on March 15, 1991. The parties specifically agreed that all 
issue, except the granting of the Decree of Divorce, were reserved for 
further determination by the Court at a time convenient to the Court 
and counsel. 
The Defendant argues that $148,000 in Promissory Notes was post-
divorce and should not have been valued in the marital estate. 
The bifurcation was necessary to the Plaintiff's mental and 
physical health. A letter was submitted from Dr. Lowry A. Bushnell 
stating that the Plaintiff was under extreme mental anguish and 
anxiety due to the long process of the settlement of her pending 
divorce. Dr. Bushnell goes on to recommend that for the Plaintiff's 
good and well-being that the parties be divorced prior to the 
settlement. A letter was submitted from the psychotherapist, Thomas 
G. Harrison, stating that the parties' divorce be granted as soon as 
possible in order to allow the family to even out emotionally. A 
letter from Bishop James E. Gleason was submitted which stated that 
the Defendant had invited a new girl friend and her children to live 
in with him and this is clearly an embarrassment to the Coats children 
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while at school, and that the stresses arising out of this situation 
would be partially alleviated if their father was no longer married 
to their mother. As such, the bifurcation was necessary to the well-
being of the Plaintiff and the parties' children. Even though the 
parties were divorced, all property issues remained outstanding. As 
such, the standards set forth in Howell v. Howell, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 
18, should apply. In Howell, the Court stated that the standard of 
living in setting alimony should consider the standard of living 
during the marriage up to the time of trial. The same standard should 
apply to valuation of the estate. The bifurcation was necessary to 
the well-being of the Plaintiff and the minor children. However, the 
only issue that was resolved by the issue of bifurcation itself was 
the termination of the marriage. There had been no discovery, no 
assessment of value, no settlement proposals; in fact, the proceedings 
had only begun. All other remaining issues were reserved. Therefore, 
the Howell standard applies, and the Court properly valued the 
Promissory Notes at the time of trial. 
It is not unusual that cases arise where a divorce must be 
granted. In the present case, two experts and an ecclesiastical 
leader indicated that divorce was essential to the well-being of 
Plaintiff and the children. If the Court determined valuation of the 
marital estate at the time of divorce in bifurcated proceedings, the 
result would be that there would be no bifurcated proceedings and 
families would suffer. So little is known about the marital estate 
at the time of bifurcation that a reasonable attorney would never 
advise bifurcated proceedings if it would impact the position of the 
estate. The purpose of bifurcated proceedings is to protect the 
emotional interest of the spouse and children. This Court cannot 
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allow bifurcated proceedings to be lost as a remedy for that purpose. 
II. 
THE LOWER COURT'S RECOGNITION OF THE $270,000 DEBT OWED TO 
ISABEL COATS IS FULLY SUPPORTABLE BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The Trial Court's Assessment when Judging Credibility of the 
Witness Should Not be Disturbed on Appeal. 
Findings of Fact in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly 
erroneous standard of review such that "due regard shall be given to 
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a); Jense v. 
Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989). 
Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1991), states that the District 
Court's Findings of Fact are based on a Judgment of the credibility 
of the witnesses. It is the province of the trier of fact who 
assesses the credibility of witnesses, and we will not second guess 
the trial court when there is reasonable evidence to support its 
findings. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) states: 
"Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts 
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, 
and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting 
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly 
set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are 
not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the 
court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the 
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need 
not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The decision on all 
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground." 
The Appellant argues that the lower Court erred in failing to 
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recognize the full amount of debt that Defendant owed to his mother. 
The Defendant requested that Isabel Coats be called as a witness out 
of order because she had to return to California. Mrs. Coats 
testified on direct examination to the authenticity of a Promissory 
Note executed by Peter M. Coats (Exhibit No. 50). She testified that 
it was an open-ended Note and that she did not recall the exact day 
when she received it. She testified that the money was disbursed in 
increments from her Kidder-Peabody margin account as necessary for the 
Brandon Canyon development. She testified that she would contact her 
brother, Fred Moreton, at Kidder-Peabody and would either write him 
a letter or telephone and follow up with the letter regarding the 
disbursement. Mrs. Coats was handed Exhibit P-50 and asked whether 
the letters attached to the Note represented the draws against the 
Note and she replied, "yes." She testified that the Promissory Note 
was bona fide and that she expected repayment. On cross-examination, 
Mrs. Coats testified as follows: 
Q. Mrs. Coats, I am going to hand you the original note 
which has been marked as Defendant's Exhibit No. 50, and I 
am going to go through a bit of your testimony. You 
testified to the Court that you received that note during 
January of 1990. Is that correct? 
A. I am sorry, counsel, I do not know that it was January it 
came. It probably was put in the bottom of a file drawer 
and I can retrieve it. 
Q. I did understand your testimony correctly when I heard 
you say to the Court that you received it before March 3, 
1990; that is the second page of the document? 
A. I believe so, yes. 
Q. Ms. Coats— 
A. It was. 
Q. —Isn't it true, and I want to ask this question to you 
in the straight-forward fashion, isn't it true that this 
note was manufactured by Peter Coats after the commencement 
of these proceedings and sent to you at a date long after 
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Kathryn Coats commenced these proceedings for divorce? 
No. 
So you received then that note in its original form on a 
date sometime in early 1990? 
Yes. 
Ms. Coats. I want you to look at the notary stamp on 
that document. Do you see who it was notarized by? 
Yes. 
What's the name there? 
Janet H. Wilkinson. 
Do you know Janet H. Wilkerson? 
Yes. 
That is Peter's secretary? Do you know that she didn't 
begin to work for Peter until after January 1990 sometime? 
I didn't know when she started to work. 
I want to ask you— 
May I answer: I do not know that the note I have is 
notarized. 
Isn't this the note you have in front of you? You 
testified this is the original note. 
Yes, but I don't know whether this business on it at the 
bottom was there when I got the note. 
You told the Court that it was, you received in its 
current form. Do you change your testimony at this point? 
I cannot be sure, sir. 
I will ask you this question, and I preface it with 
something which the Court may take judicial notice of, and 
I would ask the Court to do so, that the notary bond is 
issued in this State for four year's of validity; that is, 
that it is only valid for four years. Ms. Coats, you 
notice that the stamp date on the expiration for Janet 
Wilkerson is September 10, 1995. Do you see that on the 
document in front of you? 
It must be on this thing. Yes, I see it, yes. 
You subtract from 1995, it would not be possible for this 
notary bond to have been issued prior to September 20, 
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1991. So do you realize that? 
A. I did not realize that, and I do not realize that—I'm 
sorry, I do not. I was looking at the top part of the note 
that Peter signed to Wally and me. 
Q. I'm going to ask you the question one more time. This 
note in fact was manufactured by Peter and sent to you long 
after these divorce proceedings began, wasn't it? 
A. No. 
Q. Didn't Peter indicate to you that as a result of the pre-
trial in front of the Court and the assertion that there 
was no evidence documenting the $400,000 in liability to 
you, that you would have to have a note, and he sent you 
this note? 
A. No. 
Q. And you say that even in light of the fact that this note 
could not have existed in its present form prior to 
September 20, 1991? 
A. As I say, I do not know that this bottom was on the note 
he sent me. 
Q. Ms. Coats, these copies of the letters, did you prepare 
those on a date subsequent to September 20, 1991, at your 
son's request? 
A. No, I did not. [TR 988-991] 
She further testified: 
Q. Continuing this cross-examination, your Honor, if I may. 
As I understand your testimony, the documents the Court has 
admitted, Defendant's Exhibit No. 50, the promissory note, 
then this supplemental documents that support the funds you 
loaned to Peter, is that— 
A. That's for Brandon Canyon, for this last question. 
Q. As I understood your testimony, you loaned up to 
$400,000, and as the note says it was from $400,000, that 
Peter was not to borrow in excess of that amount in any 
event. 
A. He was not to borrow more than $400,000 under this note. 
I do not know if it was—the note was never—. 
Q. Alright. And he borrowed he borrowed—you've written 
letters to your brother and told your brother to make 
changes or disbursements so that it could be accomplished? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. That is the intent of the document? 
A. That's the intent of the document. [TR 999] 
In closing argument, the Plaintiff's counsel argued that 
the Defendant is not beyond creating documents because D-50 
is a document where the notary stamp had an expiration date 
of September 20, 1995, and the date on the Note was 
January, 1990. Plaintiff's counsel argued pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 46-1-3(4) which states that each notary 
public shall be commissioned for the term of four years 
unless the commission is revoked under Utah Code Annotated 
§ 46-1-16, or resigned. 
Melody J. Rasmussen, CPA assisting Defendant in his case, 
testified as to the loan. The Plaintiff's counsel objected to this 
witness based on lack of foundation. The Court overruled these 
objections and held that Ms. Rasmussen's testimony was relevant and 
also allowed the introduction of Exhibit D-72 into evidence. This 
exhibit contained numerous letters and accountings from Mrs. Coats, 
but Isabel Coats did not testify to their authenticity. In addition, 
copies of the checks which Defendant claimed to be interest payments 
on loans were contained in Exhibit D-72. Ms. Rasmussen testified that 
as of April 30, 1992, there was $401,000 owing on the note and $10,025 
of accrued interest owed. [TR 1379] 
The Defendant testified that there was a debt owed back to his 
mother, however, he was unable to testify as to the amount. 
The Defendant's argument that the lower Court rejected the claim 
of $411,000 on the assumption that the testimony of Mrs. Coats 
directly contradicted testimony of the accountant is 
erroneous. The Court stated: 
"The Court has to determine what is most believable, what 
was the best testimony, and I questioned counsel on what the CPA 
yesterday testified to as far as the accounting, and the Court 
is not persuaded that she—and I am not stating—well, I believe 
she is stating it truthfully for the information that she had, 
and the Court is not making any accusations as far as any 
information being generated, except that the Court cannot 
reconcile in its mind if there was an obligation of $411,025, 
that when the mother was here and on the stand, that would not, 
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have been brought out, especially when they said she had to 
leave and they wanted to get her on: So what I am saying is I am 
adopting $270,000 as the note due Isabel Coats." [TR 499-500] 
Defendant makes the argument that Plaintiff's accountant, Randy 
Petersen, acknowledges that he was aware of Defendant's $400,000 claim 
concerning the Note to Mrs. Coats and acknowledged that if there was 
such a valid Note, then Defendant should be given the liability 
deduction. Plaintiff does not dispute this argument by Defendant. 
Plaintiff, her counsel and expert were all aware of Defendant's 
allegations, but allegations are not facts. The Defendant also makes 
note of testimony of David Evans who testified that he also learned 
of a lien of Mrs. Coats for $400,000 and, in fact, a property search 
on property owned by Peter Coats revealed a $400,000 Trustee note; 
however, this simply identified a recorded document and is not 
evidence of an actual Note. 
The trial Court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses 
should not be disturbed on appeal and in this instance, the lower 
Court gave more weight and credibility to the testimony of Isabel 
Coats, the holder of the Note, finding that Defendant could have 
recalled Isabel Coats if the Note were more than she testified, but 
she was not recalled. 
III. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN CHARGING DEFENDANT WITH THE 
MARITAL ASSET VALUE OF $57,300 FOR THE BRANDON CANYON 
DEVELOPMENT. 
The Defendant acquired a real estate development project known 
as Brandon Canyon during the course of the marriage. [TR 1048-1049] 
The Defendant funded Brandon Canyon through his mother and his Kidder-
Peabody account. [TR 1048-49] The Plaintiff valued Brandon Canyon 
as follows [Exhibit P-91]: 
#23 BC $ 30,899 [DBS D-58] 
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#24 
#28 
#15 
#16 
#17 
28,000 
18,750 
165,000 
171,900 
176,900 
$591,449 
[testimony] 
(DBS D-58] 
[testimony] 
[testimony] 
[testimony] 
The Defendant valued Brandon Canyon at $319,117 [Exhibit D-99]. 
The Court adopted Defendant's valuation of Brandon Canyon. Paragraph 
14(i)(2) of the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
states: 
"The Brandon Canyon cash amount stated as a negative dollar 
value of $6,266.00 should be eliminated. In addition, the note 
on Lot 23 for Brandon Canyon, Lots 4, 15, 16 and 17, Brandon 
Canyon, should all be eliminated. The Court is not thoroughly 
convinced that the Court has received all of the information 
relating to Brandon Canyon as an asset. However, the Court is 
reasonably persuaded that the values stated by the Defendant of 
$319,117.00 is a reasonable value to be attributed to Brandon 
Canyon, except for the fact that the Defendant has received or 
will receive additional money for the sale of lots, for example, 
he has already sold Lot 16 for $171,900.00 The Court finds that 
as Brandon Canyon is developed and the lots are finished, the 
Defendant will sell more homes and will receive additional 
profit. The Court finds that the evidence is so conflicted that 
it will be necessary to adopt some arbitrary number to determine 
the value. Accordingly, the Court is convinced that the value 
of Brandon Canyon is at least some portion of Lot 16 which has 
been sold, and the value stated by the Defendant of $319,117. 
While it is arbitrary, the Court finds that the only reasonable 
method for placing a value on Brandon Canyon is to take one-
third of the value of the sale of Lot 16, which was $171,900.00 
and add that to the values stated by the Defendant. Accord-
ingly, Court finds that the value of Brandon Canyon is 
$319,117.00 plus $57,300.00 for a total value of $376,417.00 and 
Brandon Canyon will be awarded to the Defendant at that value." 
The Court appears to take an arbitrary position in valuing 
Brandon Canyon. Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 31 originally had Lot 16 
valued at $85,517. However, that amount is modified in exhibit P-90 
after the Defendant testified that Brandon Canyon Lot No. 16 was sold 
for $171,900. The Defendant testified as of April 30, 1993, that the 
value of Lot 16 was $105,000, and that value was included in the value 
of $319,117 presented by Defendant as the value of Brandon Canyon. 
It would appear that the Judge's ruling regarding Lot 16 of Brandon 
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Canyon was not all that arbitrary and is more favorable to the 
Defendant's position than was realized at the time of the trial. The 
lower Court could have taken the difference between $171,900 less 
$105,000 and assigned an additional value of $65,000 to Brandon Canyon 
rather than the $57,300 which the Court found there was no abuse of 
discretion. 
IV. 
THE DEFENDANT WAS GIVEN THE CREDIT OF $4,300 FOR 
PLAINTIFFS SALE OF THE FAMILY BOAT. 
In reviewing the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Supplemental Decree of Divorce, the Defendant was given 
credit for the Plaintiff's sale of the family boat. Paragraph 14(h) 
of the Supplemental Findings of Fact states: 
"The Court has received a great amount of testimony 
regarding the boat and its value, but the Court was persuaded 
from the outset, and is even more convinced after hearing all of 
the testimony, that the Plaintiff had possession of the boat, 
she did not have sufficient funds to pay her expenses and to 
raise her children because the Defendant was not paying child 
support or alimony as ordered, and she sold the boat to meet the 
family needs. The best evidence before the Court is that the 
Plaintiff received $4,300.00 from the sale of the boat. While 
the Court is of the opinion that the boat was worth more than 
$4,300.00, and in fact, the Plaintiff received more than 
$4,300.00, but after the payment for repairs and other costs, 
the net benefit to the Plaintiff was $4,300.00. It was as a 
result of actions on the part of the Defendant, by his failure 
to pay support as ordered, that the Plaintiff received only 
$4,300.00 for the sale of the boat. The Court finds $4,300.00 
to be the best value to be attributed to the boat, and the boat 
should be awarded to the Plaintiff. However, in light of 
amounts, which are discussed later, the amount attributed to the 
value of the boat to the Plaintiff will be taken off of the 
division of assets." 
Therefore, the Appellant is mistaken regarding this issue; the 
Defendant has been given credit and this issue should be dismissed. 
He will receive the credit when he pays the estate equalization. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant's argument that the lower Court erred in determin-
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ing that approximately $148,000 in Promissory Notes were part of the 
marital estate subject to division when such Notes came from non-
marital funds of the Kidder-Peabody account, were all issued after the 
parties were divorced, and were all payable back into the Kidder-
Peabody fund was genuinely raised for the firs time on this Appeal. 
The Appellant failed to genuinely raise the issue before the trial 
Court and the Court never had a real opportunity to rule on the post-
divorce assets issue. In addition, even if the issue of the $148,000 
of notes had been raised at the trial, the trial Court's determination 
that the Notes should be included in the marital estate is appropriate 
based on the evidence presented at trial that the Promissory Notes 
were commingled and became part of the marital estate. Finally, the 
marital estate should be determined at the time of the trial and 
bifurcated divorce proceeding. The evidence clearly indicates that 
bifurcation was necessary for the well-being of the Plaintiff and the 
minor children, and that the only issue which was resolved by the 
issue of bifurcation itself was the termination of the marriage. 
There have been no discovery, no assessment of value, no settlement 
proposals; in fact, the proceedings had only begun. All other 
remaining issues were reserved. As such, the Court properly valued 
the Promissory Notes at the time of the trial. 
The lower Court's recognition of the $270,000 debt owed to Isabel 
Coats is fully supportable by the evidence. The trial Court's 
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses should not be disturbed 
on Appeal, and in this instance, the lower Court gave more credibility 
to the testimony of Isabel Coats, the holder of the Note. 
The lower Court did not err in charging Defendant with the 
marital asset value of $57,300 for the Brandon Canyon development. 
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The Judged ruling regarding Lot 16 of Brandon Canyon is more 
favorable to the Defendant's position, and it is clear there was 
no abuse of discretion in this matter. 
The Defendant was given the credit of $4,300 for Plaintiff's sale 
of the family boat and Appellant is mistaken regarding this issue. 
The Defendant will receive the credit when he pays the estate 
equalization. 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
7. Did the Court commit error by awarding Defendant rights of 
visitation without supervision in contradiction to the expert 
testimony presented to the Court. 
8. Did the Court commit error by directing the Plaintiff to 
replace Mr. Tom Harrison with another counselor as the children's 
counselor. 
9. Did the Court commit error by directing that the payment of 
alimony would terminate ten years from the date of commencement, which 
date of the commencement for the payment of alimony was June 16, 1992. 
10. Did the Court commit error in its finalization of 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 91 as follows: 
a. By valuing Northridge furnishings at $4,500 and awarding the 
furnishings at that value even though the Defendant has testified at 
trial that the value of said property was $18,000; 
b. By discounting notes receivable on Plaintiff's Exhibit 91 
at a discount rate of 20% instead of 10%; 
c. By eliminating Target Capitol as an asset of the marital 
estate even though the parties agreed that it was an asset; 
d. By failing to recognize the entire liability of the 
Plaintiff to her father, Kenneth Tuck, which was incurred during the 
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divorce proceedings to pay attorney's fees, expert fees, and to 
maintain the family when he failed to pay support. 
11. Did the Court err by failing to award the Plaintiff all 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in these proceedings. 
12. Did the Court err by failing to award the Plaintiff 
reasonable fees for the experts, i.e., accountants, appraisers, 
engineers and other experts who appeared on her behalf and assisted 
her in the preparation and presentation of her case. 
13. Did the Court err by allowing the Defendant to be awarded 
any of the minor children as dependents for the purposes of filing his 
state and federal income taxes. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff was 19 years old at the time of marriage and 
had completed one year of college. The Defendant had completed three 
years of undergraduate education and attended college the last time 
in 1982. [TR 700] 
2. The Plaintiff testified that she anticipates attending 
Holland's College in Roanoke, Virginia, in a program for displaced 
homemakers. The Plaintiff testified that she was going to study 
psychology and obtain a Master's Degree so that she could pursue a 
career as a school psychologist. [TR 701] 
3. The Plaintiff testified that she has not worked even part-
time since she was in high school and has not been employed on a 
regular basis. [TR 703] 
4. The Plaintiff testified that she did not have any marketable 
skills. [TR 703] 
5. The Plaintiff testified that she tried to attend USF Real 
Estate Examination Course this last summer and did not complete the 
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course, but that it is her desire to complete her education. [TR 700] 
6. The Plaintiff testified that it is her desire based on the 
report of Dr. Reisinger and reviewing the testimony of Mr. Harrison 
that there be supervised visitation. [TR 202] 
7. The Plaintiff testified that the Defendant has demonstrated 
violent behavior immediately preceding the parties' separation in 
1989-1990. [TR 766] 
8. The Plaintiff testified that on one occasion in the middle 
of the night, she was asleep when the Defendant threw a lamp across 
the room then he went downstairs and punched a hole in the wall be-
cause he was angry that Plaintiff had hung up a necklace on a hook so 
he ripped it off the wall and then broke the necklace. [TR 766-767] 
9. The Plaintiff testified to Exhibit No. P-34, a letter 
written by the Defendant stating that he was a sexaholic. [TR 203] 
10. The Plaintiff testified that there had been virtually no 
visitation by the Defendant since March, 1992, with the exception of 
one visitation that occurred in December, 1991. 
11. The children's therapist for almost two years, Thomas J. 
Harrison, LCSW, testified that Mr. Coats has significant emotional 
problems and mental health disorder. [TR 664] 
12. Mr. Harrison testified that the Defendant is in need of 
significant treatment individually and is in need of treatment with 
his children conjointly before he should be allowed to visit with them 
without supervision. [TR 664] 
13. Mr. Harrison testified that he believed there is a potential 
for danger to the children if visitation occurred without supervision. 
[TR 665] 
14. Mr. Harrison testified that Defendant has a history of a 
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21. Mr. Harrison testified regarding his concerns that Defendant 
has an inability to relate to personal needs of the children; that he 
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has an agenda; that he has an inability to understand the children's 
feelings; to count their feelings, to relate to how they feel. The 
children shared this information to Mr. Harrison through play therapy 
and conversational therapy and they indicated lack of interaction with 
their father which says their father does not have the ability to move 
out of his own personality, his own needs, and relate appropriately 
to the children. [TR 671] 
22. Mr. Harrison testified that he saw strong signs of a 
personality disorder. [TR 672] 
23. Mr. Harrison testified that he had seen no improvement 
whatsoever in Defendant in regards to his mental disorder and 
personality disorder and that Defendant is unable to be a functional 
parent to his children. [TR 672] 
24. Mr. Harrison testified that he is concerned for the 
children's emotional safety and personal safety. [TR 673] 
25. Mr. Harrison testified that he has not personally witnessed 
interaction between Mr. Coats and the children. [TR 674] 
26. Mr. Harrison testified that he had a minor difference with 
the Defendant and hung up the telephone with Mr. Coats because he had 
already shared with Mr. Coats what he was going to do for the 
children. Mr. Harrison felt that the Defendant was angry, frustrated 
and wanted Mr. Harrison to do something which Mr. Harrison thought was 
not proper for him to do. [TR 680] 
27. Mr. Harrison testified that on a supervised level, the 
Defendant should have regular visitation but without any overnight 
visitation. [TR 686] 
28. Plaintiff's Exhibit P-14 was submitted without objection. 
Exhibit P-14 is the psychological visitation evaluation conducted by 
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basis will likely instill the most sense of trust in the children. 
g. The adjustment from supervised to unsupervised visitation 
should be determined by the children's therapist as well as by the 
family therapist based upon the children's progress in their 
relationship with their father. Once visitation is determined to be 
unsupervised, these need to be outlined specifically in order to avoid 
conflicts. At no time should Mr. Coats have visitation with the 
children and have a female companion present unless he plans to re-
marry. Overnight visits should be reserved for later when the 
children feel comfortable with them. These should never be forced. 
It is likely that Peter, Jr., will be able to have unsupervised and 
overnight visits sooner than the girls. However, this should not be 
pushed too quickly. 
h. If at all possible, as soon as the intensity between Mr. and 
Mrs. Coats is reduced in terms of their own relationship, therapeutic 
mediation should assist them in coming to terms with providing the 
children with the opportunity of having a safe and healthy relation-
ship with both parents. [TR 659] 
29. The Defendant testified that he was involved with a 
relationship group which had 25 people in the class which dealt with 
issues of divorce and children and being able to communicate on a fair 
basis. [TR 1419] 
30. The Defendant testified that he had been to see a psycholo-
gist, Dr. Kenneth Jackson, who is a therapist in Provo. [TR 1420] 
He did not say how often. 
31. The Defendant testified that he has not taken the children 
to see Dr. Jackson. [TR 1422] 
32. The Defendant testified that Dr. Reisinger's report was in 
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deposition testimony of Kenneth Tuck who had been previously called, 
sworn and testified in the case as a witness for the purpose of a 
trial". [TR 540-541] Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 was admitted without 
objection. 
42. Kenneth Tuck testified that the Plaintiff had executed 
Promissory Notes to him for $4,350, $3,785, $7,649, $11,237, $4,951, 
$4,290 and $4,725. [Deposition pp. 4-8] 
43. Mr. Tuck testified that the Promissory Notes were payable 
at a rate of 9%. [Deposition p. 8] 
44. Mr. Tuck testified that it was not his intent to forgive the 
Promissory Notes and he expected full payment. [Deposition p. 9] 
45. Mr. Tuck testified that most of the bills were for 
professionals and, as the bills would come in, he would pay for them. 
[Deposition p. 13] 
46. Plaintiff testified that she borrowed money from Mr. Tuck 
signed Promissory Notes for the amounts borrowed. [TR 739] 
47. Plaintiff testified that she owes Mr. Tuck in excess of 
$40,000 incurred for living expenses, attorney's fees and expert 
witnesses. [TR 740] 
48. The Plaintiff testified that she was willing, as long as she 
was not paying taxes, to allow Defendant to use one or even two of the 
children as dependents, but when she was required to pay taxes, she 
wanted those dependant exemptions for herself. [TR 765] 
49. The Plaintiff testified that if the exemptions would provide 
the Defendant greater benefit, then she was willing to allow him to 
purchase those exemptions for the value of the cost to her. [TR 765] 
50. The Plaintiff provided foundation to Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 
P-37, entitled Plaintiff's Attorney's Fees. She further testified 
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conducted services for the Bar and for the community, both for the lay 
community and the legal community as well as the judicial community, 
and has served on that Committee for about five years. He testified 
that he bills at the rate of $140 per hour but will bill the Plaintiff 
at the rate of $135 per hour because within 30 days after the Plain-
tiff retained his services, his fees were increased to $140. [TR 2843] 
57. Plaintiff's counsel testified that his legal assistant, Dee 
Ann Keller, has had twelve years of experience in the legal community. 
He testified that she generally saves clients an extraordinary amount 
of money by taking their telephone calls, helping them through 
problems which occur, helping them with preparation of their 
documents, by helping them to get to Court and by helping them get 
their problems solved. He further testified that his effective 
billing rate for trial time is $185 an hour which includes Dee Ann 
Keller's time. [TR 280-282] 
58. Defendant's counsel did not cross-examine Plaintiff's 
counsel or object to the reasonableness of the attorney's fees. 
59. The Plaintiff testified that experts in this case were 
necessary because of Defendant's failure to cooperate in discovery and 
payment of support. [TR 778-779] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The Court committed error by awarding Defendant rights of 
visitation without supervision in contradiction to the expert 
testimony presented to the Court. The lower Court fully erred in 
refusing to adopt the positions of Dr. Mercedes Reisinger and the 
children's therapist, Thomas Harrison. Dr. Reisinger's report was 
admitted into evidence without objection or cross-examination and 
stands on its own as the preponderance of evidence on the issue of 
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visitation. Both professionals clearly stated that supervised 
visitation would be necessary and in the children's best interest. 
The evidence presented by Dr. Reisinger and Mr. Harrison is overwhelm-
ing, and it is clear that the Court simply ignored the evidence pre-
sented and abused its discretion by entering the Order which it did. 
2. The Court committed error by directing the Plaintiff to 
replace Mr. Thomas Harrison with another counselor as the children's 
counselor. The Court's rationale behind this was that there existed 
animosity between the Defendant and Mr. Harrison. However, the Court 
failed to recognize the recommendation of Dr. Reisinger who stated 
that the children should continue in therapy with Mr. Harrison. In 
addition, Mr. Harrison had been treating the children for almost two 
years, and the children had gained trust and confidence. It is clear 
that the Judge failed to consider the children's best interest in this 
matter and considered only the best interest of the Defendant. 
3. The Court committed error by directing that alimony 
would terminate ten years from the date of commencement which was June 
16, 1992. The parties in this case were married over thirteen years, 
constituting a long-term marriage. In Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 
(Utah App. 1992) , the Court upheld and awarded permanent alimony based 
upon a six-year marriage. The facts in the Watson case are similar 
to the facts in the present case, and it is clear that the Court 
abused its discretion by limiting the term of alimony. 
4. The Court committed error in its finalization of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit P-91 as follows: 
a. By valuing Northridge furnishings at $4,500 even though the 
Defendant has testified at trial that the value of said property was 
$18,000. The only evidence regarding valuation of the Northridge 
35 
property was the Defendant's own testimony. The Court was clearly in 
error by arbitrarily reducing the amount from $18,000 to $4,500. 
b. By discounting notes receivable from Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 
91 as a discount rate of 20% instead of 10%. Plaintiff no longer 
seeks relief on this issue and accepts the Court's valuation. 
c. By eliminating Target Capitol as an asset of the marital 
estate even though the parties agreed that it was an asset. Even 
though there was no testimony regarding this asset, it's value was 
undisputed based on Plaintiff's Exhibit P-91 and Defendant's Exhibit 
D-59. The Court simply refused to include it in the marital estate, 
and the case should be reversed on this issue with instructions to set 
the value stipulated by both parties and include Target Capitol as an 
asset of the marriage which is awarded to Defendant. 
d. By failing to recognize the entire liability of the 
Plaintiff to her father which was incurred during the divorce 
proceedings to pay attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and to 
maintain the family. The testimony regarding liability owed to 
Plaintiff's father was undisputed. Therefore, the Court should 
recognize the entire liability owed by Plaintiff to her father. 
5. The Court erred by failing to award the Plaintiff all 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in these proceedings. The 
Plaintiff testified pursuant to Plaintiff's Exhibit P-5 and Exhibit 
P-37 that her attorney's fees were in excess of the $20,000 awarded 
by the Court as attorney's fees. Such award entirely ignored the 
liability owed to Tuck. Plaintiff's counsel testified to the amount 
and reasonableness of attorney's fees and Defendant's counsel did not 
object. The Court made the finding on the total legal fees but simply 
ordered Defendant to pay only $20,000 of those fees offering no 
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explanation of the reduction and failure to recognize the liability 
to Mr. Tuck. Because of the evidence of Plaintiff's attorney's fees 
is adequate and undisputed, the Court abused its discretion in not 
awarding all the fees. 
6. The Court erred by failing to award the Plaintiff reasonable 
fees for experts, i.e., accountants, engineers, appraisers and other 
experts who appeared on her behalf and assisted her in the preparation 
and presentation of her case. Plaintiff testified that she incurred 
expert witness fees in the case and that it was her desire to be 
awarded 100% of those expert fees which total $14,200. Peterson v. 
Peterson. 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991), applies to the facts of this 
case, and the Plaintiff should be awarded expert fees in the sum of 
$14,200. The Plaintiff testified that she would have to liquidate the 
marital estate in order to pay expert fees and attorney's fees if the 
Court did not award such fees. The lower Court's decision to deny 
expert fees in this case should be reversed with instruction to award 
$14,200 in expert fees. 
ARGUMENT 
V. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY AWARDING DEFENDANT RIGHTS OF 
VISITATION WITHOUT SUPERVISION IN CONTRADICTION TO THE 
EXPERT TESTIMONY PRESENTED TO THE COURT. 
The statutory standard governing visitation is "best interest of 
the child." U.C.A. § 30-3-10. The lower Court clearly erred by 
refusing to adopt the positions of Dr. Mercedes Reisinger and the 
children's therapist, Thomas Harrison. Dr. Reisinger's report was 
admitted without objection or cross examination and stands on its own 
as the preponderance of evidence. Notably, Dr. Reisinger's evaluation 
was a visitation evaluation done only for the purpose of determining 
appropriate visitation by the Defendant who is an admitted sex addict. 
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Both professionals clearly stated that supervised visitation would 
be necessary and in the children's best interests. The only 
contradiction to their recommendation of supervised visitation is the 
Defendant's own testimony, which certainly cannot be relied upon as 
an expert, and statements made by Ms. Francis Gomez, who was hired by 
the Defendant to supervise the visitation and certainly did not 
qualify as an expert. Ms. Gomez did write a report on her own 
volition regarding visitation, and even in her own report, she stated 
that she noticed a remarkably conflicted relationship between the 
Defendant had the oldest daughter. The evidence presented by Dr. 
Reisinger and Mr. Harrison is overwhelming and clear that Defendant's 
visitation should be supervised. The Court clearly ignored the 
evidence presented and abused its discretion by entering an Order 
which contradicted the evidence presented. The Court clearly chose 
to simply ignore the testimony of the experts and particularly the 
report of Dr. Reisinger. It was as if the visitation evaluation and 
the report were never written. Greater abuse of this issue could not 
have been committed by the Court. The matter should be remanded with 
instruction to follow the recommendations of the experts. 
VI. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY DIRECTING THE PLAINTIFF TO 
REPLACE MR. TOM HARRISON WITH ANOTHER COUNSELOR AS THE 
CHILDREN'S COUNSELOR. 
The Court ordered that the Plaintiff replace the children's 
therapist, Thomas Harrison, with another therapist. The Court's 
rationale behind this was that there existed animosity between the 
Defendant and Mr. Harrison. [TR 493] 
The Court, however, failed to recognize the recommendation of Dr. 
Reisinger that states that the children should continue in therapy 
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with Mr. Harrison. In additionf Mr. Harrison had been treating the 
children for almost two years and the children had gained trust and 
confidence. It is clear that the Judge failed to consider the 
children's best interest in this matter, but considered only the 
interest of the Defendant. Simply because Defendant testified that 
he did not like Mr. Harrison, the Court ordered the change. Again, 
the Court abused its discretion by placing Defendant's interests ahead 
of the children's. This matter should be reversed 
VII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY DIRECTING THAT ALIMONY WOULD 
TERMINATE TEN YEARS FROM THE DATE OF COMMENCEMENT WHICH WAS 
JUNE 16, 1992. 
Trial Courts have broad discretion in making alimony awards. 
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421-423 (Utah App. 1990). The appeals 
Court will not upset a trial Court for the award of alimony so long 
as the trial Court exercises its discretion within the appropriate 
legal standards, Id. The Court will not disturb the trial Court's 
award of spousal support absent a showing of clear and prejudicial 
abuse of discretion, Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96-100 (Utah 1986). 
The Courts have developed three factors which must be considered 
in affixing a reasonable alimony award: 
a. Financial conditions and needs of the wife; 
b. The ability of the wife to produce income for herself; 
c. The ability of the husband to provide support. 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). Failure to consider the 
Jones factors in fashioning alimony awards constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. Stephens v. Stephens, 54 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 1988). 
The matter of appropriate alimony was addressed in Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). An alimony award should after a 
39 
marriage such as this and to the extent possible, equalize the 
parties' respective standard of living and maintain the standard of 
living as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during 
the marriage. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), Higlev 
v. Higley, 676 P.2d 379-381 (Utah 1983), Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 
(Utah 1988). The Court reaffirmed its position in Gardner when it 
restated the three factors for consideration of alimony and stated 
that all three factors must be considered and the ultimate test of 
propriety of an alimony award is whether, given all of these factors, 
the party receiving alimony will be able to support himself or herself 
"as nearly as possible at the standard of living...enjoyed during the 
marriage." Jones, 700 P.2d 1075 (quoting English 565 P.2d 411). 
The majority of the Court intended the principle stated in 
Gardner and reaffirmed in Davis to have particular significance when 
it stated: 
An alimony award should, after a marriage as this and to 
the extent possible, equalize the parties' respective standards 
of living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to 
the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. 
In Howell v. Howell 802 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991, the Court 
applied the equalization standard in conjunction with the Jones 
factors. The Court stated: 
Trial courts must consider the following factors in setting 
alimony: (1) the financial needs of the recipient spouse; (2) 
the recipient's ability to produce income; and (3) the ability 
of the payor spouse to provide support. Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d 
649 (Utah 1988) 
The parties in this case were married over thirteen years, 
constituting a long-term marriage. In Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1 
(Utah App. 1992), the Court upheld an award of permanent alimony based 
upon a six-year marriage. The facts in Watson are similar to the 
facts in the present case; both Mrs. Coats and Mrs. Watson did not 
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work outside the home but remained in the home to care for the child-
ren. Mr. Watson had an average gross income of $93,688.75, and Mr. 
Coats' average gross income was determined to be $137,596. It is clear 
that the Court abused its discretion by limiting the term of alimony. 
VIII. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ITS FINALIZATION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT P-91 AS FOLLOWS: 
Standard of Review. A standard of review applicable to appeals 
involving divorce decrees is Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 
1990). The Court stated that in a divorce proceeding: 
Determining and assigning values to marital property is a 
matter for the trial court, and this court will not disturb 
those determinations absent a showing of clear abuse of discre-
tion. To permit appellate review of the property distribution, 
the distribution must be based upon adequate factual findings 
and must be in accordance with the standards set by this state's 
appellate courts. We will not disturb a trial court's findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous, that is, against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or unless we reach a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made. 
A. BY VALUING NORTHRIDGE FURNISHINGS AT $4,500 EVEN THOUGH IE 
DEFENDANT HAS TESTIFIED AT TRIAL THAT THE VALUE OF S A I D 
PROPERTY WAS $18,000. 
Defendant testified that the value of the Northridge furnishings 
were $18,000. [TR 456] 
On cross-examination, Plaintiff's Exhibit P-80 was admitted into 
evidence listing the personal property located at Northridge along 
with certain values. 
On cross-examination, the Defendant testified that his values may 
be retail; however, the Defendant accepted $18,000 as the value of the 
Northridge furnishings. The Judge stated in his Bench ruling that: 
Now the Northridge furnishings, I am not persuaded that, as 
the Defendant was on the stand and testified, that he understood 
the appraisal situation as far as personal property is con-
cerned, I know he didn't. I think he was stating what the 
allowable was that the property had to him, and probably it is 
good property, and probably it cost that much, and it was 
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valuable. It is very understandable for him to give the 
opinions that he did. 
But this court is not persuaded by that, and I just have to 
arbitrarily—I'm no appraiser and I can't sit down and go over 
each one of those items and say it should be this and that. I 
am cutting that appraisal down to one-fourth. I think that's 
about what the other appraisals have been, and I am awarding the 
property to him for the sum of $4,500. 
The only evidence regarding valuation of the Northridge property 
was the Defendant's own testimony as to the values. The Court was 
clearly in error by arbitrarily reducing the amount from $18,000 to 
$4,500. The case should be reversed on this issue with instructions 
that the value of the "Northridge personal property" is $18,000 
B. BY DISCOUNTING NOTES RECEIVABLE ON PLAINTIFF'S 
EXHIBIT NO. 91 AS A DISCOUNT RATE OF 20% INSTEAD 
OF 10%. 
Plaintiff no longer seeks relief on this issue and accepts the 
Court's valuation. 
C. BY ELIMINATING TARGET CAPITOL AS AN ASSET OF 
THE MARITAL ESTATE EVEN THOUGH THE PARTIES 
STIPULATED THAT IT WAS AN ASSET. 
Both parties agreed that Target Capitol was an asset. Even 
though there was not testimony regarding this asset, its existence and 
value is undisputed but the Court simply refused to include it in the 
marital estate. This case should be reversed on this issue with 
instructions to include Target Capitol as an asset of the marriage, 
set the value stipulated by both parties, and award the asset to 
Defendant as agreed. 
D. BY FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE ENTIRE LIABILITY OF 
THE PLAINTIFF TO HER FATHER WHICH WAS INCURRED 
DURING THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS TO PAY ATTORNEYS 
FEES, EXPERT FEES AND TO MAINTAIN THE FAMILY. 
In considering this issue, the Court will need to recognize that 
the liability to Mr. Tuck includes attorney's fees and expert fees, 
and when determining this issue, the Court must consider VIII.D., IX. 
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and X. as part of this point. The trial Court did not recognize the 
liability owed to Mr. Tuck and failed to recognize that the bulk of 
the liability was attorney's fees, expert fees and living expenses 
incurred because Defendant failed to pay support as ordered by the 
Temporary Order. 
The Court admitted Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 without objection 
as the trial testimony of Plaintiff's father, Kenneth Tuck, who had 
been previously called, sworn and testified at deposition in the case 
as a witness for the purpose of trial. Mr. Tuck testified that the 
Plaintiff, had executed Promissory Notes to him for $4,350, $3,785, 
$7,649, $11,237, $4,951, $4,290 and $4,725. Mr. Tuck testified that 
the Promissory Notes were payable at the rate of 9% and that he 
expected full payment of these Notes. He testified that most of the 
bills were for professionals and as bills would come in, he would pay 
for them. The Plaintiff also testified that she borrowed money from 
her father, Mr. Tuck, and signed Promissory Notes for the amounts 
borrowed. The Plaintiff testified that she owed her father in excess 
of $40,000 incurred for living expenses, attorney's fees and expert 
witness fees. The testimony regarding liability owed to Mr. Tuck was 
undisputed. Therefore, the Court should recognize the entire 
liability owed by Plaintiff to her father, which was incurred during 
the divorce proceedings to pay attorney's fees, Muir v. Muir, 847 P.2d 
736 (Utah App. 1992), expert witness fees, Peterson v. Peterson, 818 
P.2d 1305-1309 (Utah App. 1991), and to maintain the family. 
IX. 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO AWARD THE PLAINTIFF ALL 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN THESE PROCEEDINGS. 
A trial Court may use its sound discretion to award attorney's 
fees in divorce proceedings pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 
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(1989). Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305-1309 (Utah App. 1991); 
Val v. Val, 810 P.2d 489-493 (Utah App. 1991). 
-In using its sound discretion, the trial Court must take into 
account three factors: (1) the financial need of the receiving spouse; 
(2) the ability of the other spouse to pay; and (3) the reasonableness 
of the requested fee. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 493 (Utah App. 1991); 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah App. 1988). The 
District Court has discretion to order either party to pay the other 
party's attorney's fees in a divorce action. Utah Code Annotated § 
30-3-3 (1989); Mauahan v. Mauahan, 770 P.2d 156, 162, (Utah App. 
1989). Where the "evidence supporting the reasonableness of the 
requested attorney's fees is both adequate and entirely undisput-
ed...the court abuses it's discretion in awarding less than the amount 
requested unless the reduction is warranted by one or more of the 
established factors." Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517-518 
(Utah App. 1989) The Plaintiff testified pursuant to Plaintiff's 
Exhibit P-5 (the liability to Mr. Tuck) and Exhibit P-37, when taken 
together, that her attorney's fees were substantially in excess of the 
$20,000 awarded by the Court as attorney's fees. Such award entirely 
ignored the liability to Mr. Tuck and the fees he had paid for 
Plaintiff. The Plaintiff's counsel then testified to the amount and 
reasonableness of attorney's fees. The Defendant's counsel did not 
object. The Court made no finding on the total legal fees but simply 
ordered Defendant to pay only $20,000 of those fees, offering no ex-
planation for the reduction and the failure to recognize the liability 
to Mr. Tuck. Because the evidence of Plaintiff's attorney's fees is 
adequate and entirely undisputed, the Court abused its discretion. 
All of the fees paid by Plaintiff's father and all fees incurred 
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and/or outstanding for the trial should be awarded to Plaintiff. 
X. 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO AWARD THE PLAINTIFF REASONABLE 
FEES FOR EXPERTS, I.E., ACCOUNTANTS, APPRAISERS, ENGINEERS AND 
OTHER EXPERTS WHO APPEARED ON HER BEHALF AND ASSISTED HER IN THE 
PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION OF HER CASE. 
Plaintiff testified that she incurred expert witness fees in the 
case and that it was her desire to be awarded 100% of those expert 
fees which totaled $14,200. [TR 780-781] 
In closing argument, Plaintiff's counsel argued that the Court 
may award expert fees. Counsel went on to argue that if there were 
ever a case where the expert fees were justifiably incurred and made 
necessary by lack of cooperation and contemptuous behavior by the op-
posing party, it was in this case. The Judge stated from the Bench: 
The court has read the case of Peterson v. Peterson and I 
am not persuaded. I am sure Mr. Craig Peterson will probably 
not agree with this, but I am not persuaded that the case 
completely holds that professional experts, accountants, 
doctors, engineers and so forth, that it goes completely that 
far. 
I think it does go to the situation as far as the marital 
patentings of the parties, evaluators and I think the case also, 
I don't think it hold's this alone, but I know it says at one 
point that it can come off the top out of the marital assets of 
the marital parties. 
What I am saying again, I am going to deny an order for any 
professional fees in this case. 
The standard for reviewing an award of costs is an abuse 
discretion standard. Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990). 
Weiss v. Weiss, 179 P.2d 109 (Utah 1947), states that the Court has 
sound discretion to weigh circumstances of the parties and determine 
whether one spouse should give financial assistance to the other 
spouse to prosecute or defend a divorce action. The appellate Court 
must then determine whether the trial Court was within its sound 
discretion in awarding or not awarding the disputed costs. Peterson 
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v, Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305-1309 (Utah App. 1991), specifically states: 
Section 30-3-3 empowers a court to use its sound discretion 
to define costs of those reasonable amounts that are reasonably 
expended to prosecute or defend a divorce action. We also hold 
that Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-3 empowers a court to use it 
sound discretion in determining whether the award of costs based 
on need and ability to pay. 
It is clear that the Peterson standard applies to the facts of 
this case, and that Plaintiff should be awarded expert fees in the sum 
of $14,200. In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1206 (Utah 1983), the Court 
justified an award of attorney's fees and stated that the Plaintiff 
does not have to liquidate the assets of the marital estate which are 
awarded to her in order to pay her attorney's fees. In the present 
case, the Plaintiff testified that she would have to liquidate the 
marital estate in order to pay expert fees and attorney's fees if the 
Court does not award such fees. The lower Court's decision to deny 
expert fees in this case should be reversed and the Court instructed 
to award Plaintiff $14,200 in expert fees. 
XI. 
THE COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT TO BE AWARDED ANY 
OF THE MINOR CHILDREN AS DEPENDENTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
FILING STATE AND FEDERAL TAX RETURNS. 
The trial Court's awarding the tax exemption to the Defendant 
violates the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution in 
light of the 1982 Tax Reform Act and its effect on 26 U.S.C., § 152(e) 
(1988). Trial Court's award of the tax exemption is contrary to 
federal law and Utah's interpretation of the general requirement 
imposed by § 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code. Martinez v. 
Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 72 (Utah App. 1988) and Fuller v. Fullmer, 761 
P.2d 942, 950 (Utah App. 1988). The trial Court was without 
jurisdiction to enter an Order contrary to the provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Service code. 
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In addition, this Court recently held in Allred v. Allred, 835 
P.2d 974 (Utah App. 1992) that as to the tax issue, relying on Motes 
v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989) , and 26 U.S.C. § 152(e) (1988) 
from the federal tax code, that the trial Court's award of the ex-
emption to the non-custodial parent must meet two requirements before 
an exemption may be awarded to a non-custodial parent. First, the 
non-custodial parent must have a higher income and provide the major-
ity of support for the child; second, the trial Court must, from its 
findings, determine that by transferring the dependency exemption to 
the non-custodial parent, it is not only in the best interests of the 
parties, but, more importantly, it is also in the best interests of 
the child, which in all but exceptional circumstances will trans-late 
into an increased support level for the child. No such finding was 
made in this case and the Defendant cannot be awarded the exemptions. 
CONCLUSION 
1. The Court committed error by awarding Defendant rights of 
visitation without supervision in contradiction to the expert 
testimony presented to the Court. The lower Court fully erred in 
refusing to adopt the positions of Dr. Mercedes Reisinger and the 
children's therapist, Thomas Harrison. Dr. Reisinger's report was 
admitted into evidence without objection or cross-examination and 
stands on its own as the preponderance of evidence on this issue. 
Both professionals clearly stated that supervised visitation would be 
necessary and in the children's best interest. The evidence presented 
by Dr. Reisinger and Mr. Harrison is overwhelming, and it is clear 
that the Court simply ignored the evidence presented and abused its 
discretion by entering the Order which is now appealed. 
2. The Court committed error by directing the Plaintiff to 
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replace Mr. Thomas Harrison with another counselor as the children's 
counselor. The Court's rationale behind this was that there existed 
animosity between the Defendant and Mr. Harrison. However, the Court 
failed to recognize the recommendation of Dr. Reisinger who stated 
that the children should continue in therapy with Mr. Harrison. In 
addition, Mr. Harrison had been treating the children for almost two 
years, and the children had gained trust and confidence. It is clear 
that the Judge failed to consider the children's best interest in this 
matter and considered only the interest of the Defendant. 
3. The Court committed error by directing that alimony 
would terminate ten years from the date of commencement which was June 
16, 1992. The parties in this case were married over thirteen years, 
constituting a long-term marriage. In Watson v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1 
(Utah App. 1992), the Court upheld and awarded permanent alimony based 
upon a six-year marriage. The facts in the Watson case are similar 
to the facts in the present case, and it is clear that the Court 
abused its discretion by eliminating the term of alimony. 
4. The Court committed error in its finalization of Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 91 as follows: 
a. By valuing Northridge furnishings at $4,500 and ordering the 
furnishings at that value even though the Defendant has testified at 
trial that the value of said property was $18,000. The only evidence 
regarding valuation of the Northridge property was the Defendant's own 
testimony as to the values. The only evidence before the Court was 
the Defendant's valuation, and the Court was clearly in error by 
arbitrarily reducing the amount from $18,000 to $4,500. 
b. By discounting notes receivable from Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 
91 as a discount rate of 20% instead of 10%. Plaintiff no longer 
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seeks relief on this issue and accepts the Court's valuation. 
c. By eliminating Target Capitol as an asset of the marital 
estate even though the parties agreed that it was an asset. Even 
though there was no testimony regarding this asset, it's value was 
undisputed based on Plaintiff's Exhibit P-91 and Defendant's Exhibit 
D-59. The Court simply refused to include it in the marital estate, 
and the case should be reversed on this issue with instructions to set 
the value stipulated by both parties and include Target Capitol as an 
asset of the marriage. 
d. By failing to recognize the entire liability of the 
Plaintiff to her father which was incurred during the divorce 
proceedings to pay attorney's fees, expert witness fees, and to 
maintain the family. The testimony regarding liability owed to 
Plaintiff's father, Kenneth Tuck, was undisputed. Therefore, the 
Court should recognize the entire liability owed by Plaintiff to her 
father which was incurred during the divorce proceedings to pay 
attorney's fees, expert fees, and to maintain the family. 
5. The Court erred by failing to award the Plaintiff all 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in these proceedings. The 
Plaintiff testified pursuant to Plaintiff's Exhibit P-5 and Exhibit 
P-37 that her attorney's fees were in excess of $20,000 awarded by the 
Court as attorney's fees. Such award entirely ignored the liability 
owed to Mr. Tuck. Plaintiff's counsel testified to the amount and 
reasonableness of attorney's fees and Defendant's counsel did not 
object. The Court made the finding on the total legal fees but simply 
ordered Defendant to pay only $20,000 of those fees offering no 
explanation of the reduction and failure to recognize the liability 
to Mr. Tuck. Because of the evidence of Plaintiff's attorney's fees 
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is adequate and undisputed, the Court abused its discretion, and all 
the fees paid by Plaintiff's father and all fees outstanding for the 
trial should be awarded to the Plaintiff. 
6. The Court erred by failing to award the Plaintiff reasonable 
fees for experts, i.e., accountants, engineers, appraisers and other 
experts who appeared on her behalf and assisted her in the preparation 
and presentation of her case. Plaintiff testified that she incurred 
expert witness fees in the case and that it was her desire to be 
awarded 100% of those expert fees which total $14,200. Peterson v. 
Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 (Utah App. 1991), applies to the facts of this 
case, and the Plaintiff should be awarded expert fees in the sum of 
$14,200. The Plaintiff testified that she would have to liquidate the 
marital estate in order to pay expert fees and attorney's fees if the 
Court did not award such fees. The lower Court's decision to deny 
expert fees in this case should be reversed and instructed to award 
$14,200 in expert fees. 
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